THE RELATIVIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM. INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS.

Abstract

This article examines the relativization of property rights in light of human rights, as a critique of liberalism in the context of the application of the indigenous peoples' original rights, based on the jurisprudence of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, investigating its transition from a constitutional principle to an affirmative policy. The main objective is to examine whether the Supreme Court has applied the foundation of aboriginal rights in protecting indigenous land possession rights and whether such application is sufficient for the effective protection of these peoples' human rights. The methodology employed is bibliographical and documentary research, theoretically grounded in Dworkin's contributions on principles and policies, and Joaquim Barbosa's work on affirmative actions. The results demonstrate that the Supreme Court implicitly recognizes aboriginal rights as a constitutional principle; however, its application has proven insufficient to guarantee effective protection of indigenous rights. The conclusion points to the necessity of evolution in understanding and applying aboriginal rights, transcending its principle dimension to achieve implementation as an affirmative policy, capable of promoting concrete social transformations and ensuring the full realization of indigenous peoples' rights, in accordance with the Democratic Rule of Law.